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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare eﬀects of intellectual property protection, account-
ing for ﬁrms’ optimal responses to legal environments. I examine ﬁrms’ use of indirect
price discrimination in response to U.S. copyright law preventing direct price discrimina-
tion. Using data covering VHS and DVD movie distribution, I explain studios’ optimal
pricing strategies under U.S. copyright law, and determine optimal pricing strategies
under E.U. copyright law, which allows for direct price discrimination. I ﬁnd that
studios’ use of indirect price discrimination beneﬁts consumers and harms retailers.
Optimal pricing under E.U. copyright law further beneﬁts studios and consumers. I
also reanalyze these issues assuming continued DVD adoption.
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are my own.1 Introduction
This paper examines the welfare eﬀects of intellectual property protection, taking into
account ﬁrms’ optimal responses to legal environments. Of speciﬁc interest are the eﬀects
of a restriction U.S. copyright law places on ﬁrms’ abilities to directly price discriminate
based on a consumer’s intended use of a product, and ﬁrms’ responses to mitigate the
eﬀect of this restriction through legal indirect price discrimination. To identify factors
inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions under current U.S. copyright law, I empirically
examine the outcomes of two pricing strategies (no price discrimination and indirect price
discrimination) used by ﬁrms for products that are identical in content but distributed via
diﬀerent technologies. The analysis uses a new dataset covering the distribution of movies on
VHS and DVD formats to explain why alternative pricing strategies may be optimal for the
same movie distributed on diﬀerent formats, and to establish the welfare eﬀects of indirect
price discrimination strategies in the context of the U.S. copyright law. I then estimate the
welfare eﬀects of optimal pricing strategies under an alternative form of copyright protection
currently used in the E.U. that allows for direct price discrimination based on a consumer’s
intended use of a product. Finally, I consider the potential future eﬀects of current and
alternative copyright laws as ﬁrms respond to changes in the composition of DVD owners
over time.
Following the invention of the VCR, motion picture studios examined the possibility of
selling videocassette tapes of motion pictures directly to consumers. In 1979, Paramount
began licensing Fotomat to sell videocassette tapes of its movies, and soon discovered that
retailers were purchasing the tapes from Fotomat stores and renting them out at their own
stores. This was (and is) legal under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, which stipulates that
an owner of a legally-owned copy of a creative production has the right of “ﬁrst use.” This
stipulation, commonly referred to as the First Sale Doctrine, invokes copyright jurisdiction
only upon the ﬁrst sale of videocassette tapes, so that subsequent use (including rentals)
does not generate income to the copyright holder.1
1In 1977, MCA/Universal and Disney jointly sued the Sony Corporation, which created and owned
the rights to Betamax hardware, over alleged lost revenues from home recordings of broadcast television
programs. In 1984, the Supreme Court voted ﬁve-to-four in favor of Sony in Universal v. Sony. The
decision permitted home videotaping of copyrighted programs without royalty payments, but was more
broadly interpreted to uphold the First Sale Doctrine, and the case paved the way for the emerging video
rental retail industry (Childs, 1992). The First Sale Doctrine is distinct from the Fair Use Doctrine, which
addresses duplication of copyrighted materials for the purpose of fair use (such as photocopying articles for
distribution to a class).
1The First Sale Doctrine eﬀectively strips movie studios of any ability to directly price
discriminate between institutional (i.e., video rental stores) and individual users in the
home video market, because any organization can purchase videos as an individual user
and legally rent them out. Thus, movie studios in the U.S. do not charge diﬀerent prices
to video retail stores and individual buyers (although they can oﬀer quantity discounts).
In contrast, many other countries specify their copyright law so that copyright holders can
restrict use of the product after ﬁrst sale (e.g., the European Union and Australia, among
others). When selling a movie to the home video market in these countries, studios do in
fact charge very diﬀerent prices to the two types of buyers.
In the face of the legal restrictions in the U.S., copyright holders in the motion picture
industry adopted a form of intertemporal price discrimination. When releasing a movie for
home video, a ﬁrm initially sets a very high price for the videocassettes (on VHS format),
during which time the buyers are typically video rental stores purchasing rental inventory.
Subsequently, the ﬁrm lowers the price substantially, at which time the typical buyers are
end-users.2 This strategy is commonly referred to in the industry as “rental pricing,” and
has been used for approximately 90 percent of all titles on the VHS format historically. For
the remaining titles, the initial rental window is forgone in favor of generating early (and
potentially more) direct sales to consumers. For these titles, studios set a retail price in
the range of $19.99 - $26.99 immediately upon the ﬁrst release.3 This practice, referred to
as “sell-through pricing,” is typically used for children’s titles, and occasionally for popular
‘blockbuster’ titles, especially movies with ‘teenager’ appeal. Examples of sell-through
priced movies include Blair Witch Project, Titanic, and Antz.4
On the DVD format, studios have almost exclusively adopted sell-through pricing for
a movie’s DVD release, even as they maintain a rental-pricing strategy for the same-day
2Initial retail prices for VHS tapes under this strategy range from around $99.95 to $107.95. Approxi-
mately ﬁve months after its initial release, the studio re-prices the movie for “sell-through.” At this time,
the retail price falls to the range of $19.99 - $26.99 and videocassettes turn up for direct sale to consumers
at mass merchandisers and video stores. Wholesale prices facing retailers are in the range of $60 - $70 in the
ﬁrst period, and then fall to $10 - $15 after the sell-through re-pricing. An ineﬃciency of intertemporal price
discrimination is the occurrence of double-marginalization and understocking in rental markets, as retailers
purchase only a small quantity of tapes at the high “rental” price. An important contractual change in the
industry in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s has involved the use of revenue-sharing contracts to mitigate
this source of ineﬃciency, and many studios are now participating in such programs. (See Dana and Spier
(2001), and Cachon and Lariviere (2002), for theoretical analyses of such contracts, and Mortimer(2004) for
an empirical analysis of the actual contracts.)
3Wholesale prices are in the range of $10 - $15.
4Revenue-sharing contracts are typically not used on sell-through priced titles.
2release of the movie’s VHS format. For example, The Green Mile was initially released
with a VHS price of $107.95 and a same-day DVD price of $24.95. There are at least two
possible explanations for this dramatic change in the pricing policy of the new format. On
one hand, diﬀerences in the populations of consumers that adopt the DVD format in early
years versus keeping the VHS format may lead to diﬀerent optimal pricing choices. In this
case, as more low-value consumers adopt DVD hardware and choose to rent rather than
purchase on the DVD format, upstream ﬁrms (movie studios) might again choose to adopt
a rental-pricing strategy in order to discriminate between the institutional and individual
purchasers.5 On the other hand, diﬀerences in the perceived quality of owning and renting
the DVD versus the VHS format may lead to diﬀerent optimal pricing choices. In this case,
one would expect that sell-through pricing will remain the standard for pricing in the DVD
market.6
An important motivation for the adoption of sell-through pricing in the U.S. market
is the restriction eﬀectively imposed by the U.S. Copyright Act through the First Sale
Doctrine. In many other countries, VHS tapes and DVDs are simply sold at diﬀerent
prices to rental stores and individual buyers simultaneously. The ﬁrst goal of this paper
is to understand what factors inﬂuence a studio’s choice of sell-through and rental pricing
strategies, and why the choice of pricing strategy may diﬀer for the same movie on the
VHS and DVD formats. With that understanding, I seek to answer the following questions.
First, what are the welfare implications of the diﬀerent pricing strategies adopted under
current U.S. copyright law? Second, what are the welfare implications of pricing strategies
that would be optimal under the alternative form of copyright law widely used in other
countries? Finally, assuming that all current VHS users eventually adopt DVD hardware in
the future, how are the optimal pricing strategies and welfare estimates under each of the
various copyright regimes aﬀected?
I ﬁnd that ﬁrms consistently choose the more proﬁtable strategy across titles and for-
5A sell-through pricing strategy could be used in the initial phase of DVD hardware adoption in order
to stimulate direct sales to “high-value” early DVD adopters, and to take advantage of any novelty eﬀect
that new hardware adoption has on purchases of software. Under this explanation, the use of sell-through
pricing for the DVD format and rental pricing for the VHS format may help to price discriminate between
institutional and individual buyers, as most “low-value” renters would still be using the VHS format.
6An alternative explanation may be that piracy is easier on the digital DVD format, and a sell-through
pricing strategy is aimed at discouraging piracy. The eﬀects of piracy, however, are complicated: they
depend on the upstream ﬁrm’s ability to monitor piracy both by individuals and by video rental stores.
While piracy may be easier with the digital format, monitoring capabilities-especially for video rental stores-
have also improved dramatically in recent years.
3mats, and that intertemporal price discrimination beneﬁts consumers but harms retailers.
Regarding the form of the copyright law, I ﬁnd that price discrimination under an EU-style
law tends to beneﬁt studios and consumers at the expense of retailers, but that this does
not hold for movies that are currently intertemporally priced. Finally, I ﬁnd that EU-style
copyright protection allows for a more proﬁtable pricing strategy by copyright holders on
some titles when consumers have fully adopted the DVD technology, and that consumers
beneﬁt in this environment.
A growing empirical literature addresses the topic of price discrimination, and a large
literature addresses the theoretical implications of copyright provisions. However, to my
knowledge, little empirical or theoretical literature addresses the welfare implications of
copyright law through its inﬂuence on price discrimination strategies or other static best
responses in product markets for copyrighted goods. Thus, this paper complements two
distinct literatures. First, it studies the welfare implications of price discrimination, and
compares the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of price discrimination (rental, sell-through,
and EU-style pricing). Second, the paper examines the welfare eﬀects of intellectual prop-
erty protection, accounting for ﬁrms’ strategic responses to the legal environment.
A related previous study on price discrimination is Leslie (2004), which examines the
welfare eﬀects of both second- and third-degree price discrimination in Broadway theater.
Previous empirical work on price discrimination primarily tested whether or not diﬀerent
instances of price dispersion had a cost-based explanation, or a price discrimination-based
explanation (Borenstein (1991), Shepard (1991), Borenstein and Rose (1994), among oth-
ers).7 More recently, others have empirically studied the eﬀects of price discrimination in
the presence of competition. (See McManus (2001), Miravete (2002), and Busse and Rys-
man (2004)). Also related to this study, Clerides (2002) examines the implementation of
intertemporal price discrimination in book sales, and Bergstrom (2001) examines institu-
tional pricing of academic journals.8
In the home video industry, a strategy of no price discrimination can be more proﬁtable
7Leslie (2004) makes the point that, in some cases, such as Broadway and home video, we know that
price dispersion is not cost-based. Thus, the question of interest is quantifying the welfare eﬀects of price
discrimination.
8To the best of my knowledge, the diﬀerence in the pricing of VHS/DVD rentals and library subscriptions
of academic journals (where direct price discrimination occurs) is founded in the public availability of the
content of printed goods. Donations of personal subscriptions to libraries would be illegal due to “Fair Use”
violations, because the content of library journals is, in principle, available to the public, whereas the content
of a DVD is not.
4than a strategy of second-degree price discrimination, because there is a cost to implement-
ing second-degree price discrimination. The cost is that ﬁrms must reduce product quality
by delaying the sell-through release to consumers. This is similar to treatments in the the-
oretical literature in which ﬁrms destroy quality in order to better sort consumers (Mussa
and Rosen (1978) is a seminal contribution; Maskin and Riley (1984) extend their model,
and Deneckere and McAfee (1996) also model damaged goods.
The welfare eﬀects of intellectual property protection have been studied in other con-
texts, often focusing on the optimal theoretical level of copyright protection for the purpose
of inducing investment in creative works (Novos and Waldman (1984) and Yoon (2002)), or
the theoretical eﬀects of piracy or unauthorized copying on ﬁrm proﬁts and social welfare
(Ordover and Willig (1978), Johnson (1985), Liebowitz (1985), and Takayama (1994 and
1997)). Perhaps the most closely related previous paper is Liebowitz (1986), which stud-
ies the impact of price discrimination by journal publishers on the working of copyright
law. The treatment is primarily theoretical, although it reports some basic data on the
prevalence of price discrimination in the market for academic journals and is based on work
involving a Betamax court case.
The role of purchase and rental markets to segment high- and low-value consumers has
also been studied theoretically by Varian (2000), and an historical background of the video
rental industry is provided in Varian and Roehl (2001). Varian (2000) derives conditions
under which pricing exclusively for a rental market, or pricing exclusively for direct sale, will
be more proﬁtable for the owner of an information good.9 To recap, I examine the eﬀects of
second-degree price discrimination and compare these to results of two alternatives: market
segmentation (which addresses the question of the eﬀects of copyright law), and no price
discrimination (which addresses the eﬀects of the observed price discrimination). Follow-
ing these two analyses, I reconsider the answers in light of the possibility that consumers
currently using VHS technology will adopt DVD hardware in the future.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the industry and introduces the data
sources. Section 3 lays out a demand system for rentals and purchases of a movie on a
9Varian identiﬁes three factors that play a role in determining the more proﬁtable strategy: transactions
costs of renting compared to the marginal cost of production, the number of times content is viewed, and
the ability to use a rental market to segment high- and low-value consumers. The model I derive is very
similar in spirit–the main diﬀerence is that my model also incorporates intertemporal segmentation. Thus,
in the absence of contemporaneous market segmentation that might be achievable under a less restrictive
copyright law, the choice becomes whether to price discriminate intertemporally or not.
5particular format and describes the upstream ﬁrm’s choice of whether or not to use second-
or third-degree price discrimination. In section 4, I describe the dataset and the timing
of rentals and sales. Section 5 modiﬁes the demand system to incorporate institutional
details, describes the estimation strategy, and discusses results. There are two main sets
of parameters to estimate: quality levels of diﬀerent movies and formats, and parameters
of the distribution of consumers’ willingness to pay for movie quality. I allow the quality
parameters to vary according to title, use and format, and I describe the implied quality
diﬀerences of the DVD format compared to VHS. Finally, section 6 describes the counter-
factual experiments and provides the results of welfare analyses comparing: the use of rental
versus sell-through pricing (i.e., the presence or lack of second-degree price discrimination),
and also the use of current pricing regimes to the alternative pricing strategies available
under less restrictive copyright law. These counterfactuals are re-analyzed under the as-
sumption that the distribution of consumer willingness to pay for the DVD format will be
aﬀected by continued consumer migration from VHS to DVD technology in the future.
2 The Home Video Industry
In 1999, the $16 billion home video industry accounted for 55% of studios’ domestic revenues,
compared to 22% generated by theatrical revenues, and 23% from all other forms of media,
such as the sales of pay-per-view, cable, and broadcast television rights.10 Approximately
20,000 home video retailer outlets plus internet ﬁrms such as Netﬂix purchase movies on
VHS or DVD format and rent their inventory to consumers. In addition, consumers may
purchase movies on either format from video, non-specialized, or Internet retailers. Table 1
outlines market shares of rentals and purchases according to the type of retail outlet where
the rental or purchase occurred, including video specialty stores, discount merchandisers
such as Walmart, Internet (both sales and Netﬂix rentals), and others.11
The data for the present study are drawn from the population in the ﬁrst row of table
1, ‘Video Specialty retailers,’ although I make use of the data in the other rows of table 1 to
weight my estimated market shares. As shown in table 1, Video Specialty retailers represent
nearly 77 and 74 percent of all VHS and DVD rentals respectively. However, a greater
proportion of sales occur through alternative distribution channels, including Internet and
10VSDA Annual Report, 1999.
11The table is constructed from weekly data gathered through phone surveys of consumers’ purchase and
rental habits provided by Alexander and Associates and reﬂect market shares as of the spring of 2002.
6non-specialized retail outlets, and so it is important to weight the sample accordingly.
As discussed in the introduction, the distribution of videocassettes on the VHS format
often exhibits a form of intertemporal price discrimination, while the distribution of the
same movie on the DVD format displays no price discrimination. To understand the welfare
implications of alternative forms of copyright protection, it is necessary to ﬁrst describe the
diﬀerent optimal pricing strategies under current copyright law. Under “rental pricing,”
video retailers pay a linear wholesale price to the distribution arm of a movie studio (or
“distributor”) for each pre-recorded videocassette tape of a movie of around $60 to $70.12
After an initial period of rental activity (around ﬁve months), the distributor cuts the
wholesale price from the $60 - $70 range to $10 - $15, called “sell-through re-pricing.” At
this time the movie is commonly sold to individual users. This two-tiered pricing strategy is
a form of intertemporal price discrimination and helps to distinguish between institutional
(i.e., video stores) and individual buyers. Exceptions to this typical two-tiered pricing
pattern are titles priced for “sell-through.” In this case, intertemporal price discrimination
is discarded in favor of an immediate low price to stimulate early sales to individual users.13
Tables 2 and 3 detail the use of sell-through pricing for the VHS and DVD formats
respectively. These ﬁgures are compiled from the dataset described in the next section, and
include all major titles released between January 2000 and December 2001. Titles classiﬁed
as “B” or “A” earned 15-40 million or more than 40 million respectively in theatrical box-
oﬃce revenue. Table 2 shows the incidence of sell-through pricing for titles released on
VHS. Childrens and Family movies are always sell-through priced, while Romance titles are
never sell-through priced in the dataset. Science Fiction titles are somewhat more likely to
be sell-through priced than rental priced if the title has a large theatrical box-oﬃce, but
are quite unlikely (17 percent) to be sell-through priced if the theatrical performance was
poor. Contrasting to this, table 3 shows the use of sell-through pricing for the same movies
under the DVD format. With the exception of a single B title in the Drama genre, all titles
are sell-through priced.
12According to industry sources, the marginal cost of producing, packaging and shipping a pre-recorded
videocassette tape is around two dollars, and that of a DVD is around $1.25.
13Wholesale price discounts oﬀ of suggested retail prices were obtained through interviews with studio
executives. In addition to these traditional pricing strategies, revenue-sharing contracts became a widely-
used contractual arrangement between retailers and distributors beginning in 1998. These distribution
contracts are discussed in detail in Mortimer (2004). For the present analysis, I focus on 41 titles with
theatrical box oﬃce revenues of more than 55 million dollars, and for which revenue-sharing contracts were
not available. More detail is provided in the next section which describes the data.
7Finally, growth rates of DVD rentals and sales and DVD hardware adoption are pre-
sented in Table 4 for the period of analysis. DVD households, which count households with
one or more DVD players and excludes households in which the DVD player is attached to
a PC but not used for entertainment, grew from 12 million at the end of 2000 to 24 million
at the end of 2001. Quarterly growth rates show faster growth during the fourth quarter of
each year due to holiday purchases. The rate of DVD hardware adoption has been extraor-
dinarily fast: as much as 10 times faster than VCR adoption according to some industry
sources. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in addition to purchasing the new hardware to
augment or replace an existing VCR, consumers have also replaced CD players with DVD
machines. DVD rentals and sales have also shown fast growth. The second and third rows
of table 4 show total expenditures on DVD rentals and sales, and rows 4 and 5 show the
implied growth rates. Rentals grew at a pace of 90 percent from 1999 to 2000, and grew
even faster, at a rate of 146 percent, in 2001. Sales grew 146 percent from 1999 to 2000, and
grew at a rate of 66 percent in 2001. Interestingly, the pattern of growth rates of rentals
and sales is consistent with an adoption pattern in which consumers with relatively low
willingness to pay for movie quality (i.e., consumers more likely to rent than buy) adopt
DVD hardware later than consumers with high willingness to pay for movie quality (i.e.,
consumers more likely to buy than rent). Of course, this is merely suggestive evidence,
and in no way establishes a relationship between observed growth rates and unobservable
willingness to pay for movie quality.
3 Overview of Demand and Supply
In this section, I outline a model of consumer demand and ﬁrm behavior restricted by current
copyright law that speciﬁes the conditions under which second-degree price discrimination
(i.e., rental pricing) is a more proﬁtable pricing strategy than non-discriminatory linear
pricing (i.e., sell-through pricing). I also compare these outcomes to the results under an
alternative copyright law where ﬁrms are able to use third-degree price discrimination by
concurrently charging diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent types of users. The model consists of a
demand system for consumers and a supply decision for the ﬁrm.14 Consumers consider a
14I focus here on the supply decision of the ﬁrm that holds the copyright on the good, or the upstream
ﬁrm. I do not explicitly model the strategic behavior of downstream ﬁrms in response to upstream pricing
changes in this section. However, in the empirical work, I incorporate all downstream markups, which are
measured in the data. I also provide further discussion of this issue in the section on counterfactual policy
8single product that is vertically-diﬀerentiated according to whether or not the product is
rented or purchased.15 The supply decision speciﬁes ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions and solves for
the optimal pricing strategy. I consider three possibilities. First, the ﬁrm is able to simulta-
neously charge diﬀerent prices in the two markets (rental and purchase). This is a common
pricing strategy in the E.U., but is not feasible in the U.S. market because of the First Sale
Doctrine. Second, I consider simple linear pricing without price discrimination. Finally,
I consider the use of intertemporal price discrimination where the value of purchasing the
product declines over time. This general overview is intended to provide a framework for
describing the data and the estimation procedures in the following sections.
3.1 Consumer Demand
To motivate the supply decision, consider a standard model of consumer demand for two
vertically-diﬀerentiated products: the rental or purchase of a given movie title on a par-
ticular format.16 For each title, I assume that the upstream ﬁrm (in this case, the movie
studio) has monopoly ownership of that title. Consumers’ utility functions are speciﬁed by:
δs − αips if purchase
ui = δr − αipr if rent
0 otherwise
(1)
The parameters δs and δr represent the quality of purchasing and renting respectively; ps
and pr denote the prices for purchasing and renting the good. The parameter αi represents
a consumer’s marginal utility of income and diﬀers across individuals according to their
income level and their unobservable willingness to pay for movie quality.17
Consumers prefer to purchase when δs − αips > δr − αipr, and they prefer to rent
when δs − αips < δr − αipr and δr − αipr > 0. Assuming that the quality of purchasing
is greater than the quality of renting (δs > δr), and also assuming an interior equilibrium
(such that each product has non-zero market share), consumers purchase if their value of
experiments.
15In the empirical work, I also distinguish between purchases of used and new tapes. Further discussions
of this issue appear in the data description and estimation sections. I do not model competition across
diﬀerent titles.
16Bresnahan (1987) used a vertically-diﬀerentiated model to analyze the automobile industry; Song (2004)
is a more recent example in which a vertically-diﬀerentiated model is estimated. Much of the notation used
here follows that in Berry (1994).
17As is well-documented, we can also re-write this so that the αi parameter modiﬁes the δ parameter and
thus aﬀects the ‘taste’ for purchasing or renting the movie. See Tirole (1995) pp. 96-97.













Consumers with αi > ˆ α consume the outside good. Thus, if N is the number of consumers
in the market, demand is given by
N(F(˜ α)) in purchase market
N(F(ˆ α) − F(˜ α)) in rental market.
(2)
where F(α) is the cumulative distribution function of α.
3.2 Supply
The rental and sales markets for VHS and DVD formats of a movie are both characterized
by a vertically-separated industry structure, in which retailers and studios are separately
owned. Consider an example with a single retailer and a single studio; I specify proﬁt
functions for the retailer and studio in the sales market as:
πs
ret = N(F(˜ α)) · (ps − ps
w), and
πs
stud = N(F(˜ α)) · (ps
w − c).
The parameter c is the production cost for the studio, and ps
w represents the wholesale
price charged to retailers by the upstream studio. If there is perfect competition in the
retail sector and no additional costs incurred by the retailer, ps = ps
w. The presence of any
mark-ups or additional costs for the retailer at the point of sale would lead to ps = ps
w +µs
where µs is the retail mark-up.
In the rental market, retailer and studio proﬁts are given by:
πr
ret = N(F(ˆ α) − F(˜ α)) · (pr − pr
w/τ), and
πr
stud = N(F(ˆ α) − F(˜ α)) · (pr
w − c) · (1/τ).
10These speciﬁcations assume that each videocassette tape or DVD produces τ rentals.18 If
there is perfect competition in the retail sector and no additional costs incurred by the
retailer, pr = pr
w/τ. Again, the presence of mark-ups or additional costs incurred by the
retailer at the point of sale would lead to pr = pr
w/τ + µr. Assuming retailer mark-ups are





πstud = N(F(˜ α)) · (ps
w − c) + N(F(ˆ α) − F(˜ α)) · (pr
w/τ − c/τ)
where ˜ α = ˜ α(ps,pr,δs,δr) and ˆ α = ˆ α(pr,δr) as before.19
Market Segmentation (Third-degree Price Discrimination)
Under third-degree price discrimination, the upstream ﬁrm sets diﬀerent prices in the 2











All rental stores pay pr
w due to the assumption of zero retailer mark-ups (which is relaxed in
the empirical work), all consumers pay ps
w; and rental consumers pay pr
w/τ for a rental. This
strategy is not feasible under current U.S. Copyright law because ﬁrms are not allowed to
charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent uses of the product, but it represents a strategy available
to (and used by) ﬁrms in many other countries, including all the countries in the E.U..
No Price Discrimination
The second case considers the upstream ﬁrm’s pricing problem in the absence of price
discrimination (sell-through pricing). I denote the single wholesale price as pw. Note that








The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst case and the second case is that in the ﬁrst case (equation
3), the relative price of a sale compared to a rental is under the control of the upstream
ﬁrm (i.e., ˜ α depends on ps
w and pr
w). In the second case (equation 4), relative prices for a
18In later sections of the paper, I distinguish between the VHS and DVD markets, and τ, along with
other parameters of the model, is allowed to vary across formats. I also allow τ to diﬀer depending on
whether rental pricing or sell-through pricing is used. Of course, one can always consider more complicated
relationships between the inventory decisions of the retailer and the production of rentals. Mortimer (2004)
addresses this issue and compares robustness tests of alternative views of the τ variable in the context of
revenue-sharing programs. I provide further discussion in the section on counterfactual policy experiments.
19The appropriate retailer mark-ups are observed in the data and incorporated in estimation.
11purchase versus a rental are constrained by τ (i.e., ˜ α depends only on pw, because ps
w/pr
w
must equal τ). Thus, copyright holders can only set one price, and the price of the second
use of the good is then determined by the technology in the downstream market.
While the no price discrimination strategy is consistent with the U.S. copyright law and
used for virtually all movies released on the DVD format, the restriction of only being able
to set a single price can be very costly to studios. In the absence of the ability to use third-
degree price discrimination to segment the market under U.S. copyright law, upstream ﬁrms
recognized that it might be possible to discriminate over time, thus adopting a rental-pricing
strategy for many movies, in which price is lowered about ﬁve months after a title’s initial
video release. Theoretically, there is no reason to rule out a much more ﬂexible use of the
temporal dimension, where ﬁrms adjust their prices at many points in time.20 In practice,
however, upstream ﬁrms in this industry have consistently chosen a single repricing date,
eﬀectively using two time periods over which to discriminate. Consequently, I focus on
ﬁrms’ decisions to either price discriminate over two periods or to not price discriminate at
all, and the eﬀects of these decisions on consumers.
Intertemporal Discrimination Over Two Time Periods
(Second-degree Price Discrimination)
The third case considers intertemporal price discrimination over two time periods (rental
pricing). Suppose that the value of the good to consumers decays, so that the value of
purchasing in the later period is δs2 < δs.21 This is meant to reﬂect such eﬀects as word-
of-mouth, movie reviews, theatrical advertising, and other factors that might inﬂuence the
quality of purchasing a movie over time, relative to the standard discount factor.22
I make the assumption, consistent with industry facts, that the rental market is fully
served in period one.23 In other words, I assume that there are not “second-run” video
20Indeed, there is also no reason to rule out the use of intertemporal price discrimination under EU-style
copyright law (in addition to segmentation by use), and one might be interested in the potential welfare
eﬀects of such a pricing strategy.
21The quality decay diﬀers from the usual discount factor because it does not apply equally to the quality
of the movie and the price and cost factors. One could easily incorporate a discount factor for price and
cost: the simplifying assumption here is that the standard discount factor is equal to one.
22A more critical simplifying assumption in the model is that upstream ﬁrms do not choose the extent
of decay (for example, by engaging in special sales-oriented advertising campaigns or other initiatives).
However, it is diﬃcult to identify such eﬀects empirically, and I have no reason to believe that the ‘choice’
of quality decay is a ﬁrst-order decision for the upstream ﬁrm in this context.
23One could extend the model to explicitly incorporate the cost structures and proﬁt maximization problem
facing retailers. The assumption that the rental market is served in the ﬁrst period holds as long as there
is suﬃcient competition between the video rental retailers, or between video retailers and other distribution
channels for a movie such as cable, pay-per-view, etc. The assumption that the rental market is served in
12stores that delay purchasing new releases until after the new release has been re-priced.
Such video stores do not seem to be a prevalent feature of the rental market, and so I make
no distinction between a rental in period two and consumption of the outside good. The
use of intertemporal price discrimination introduces a third product into consumers’ choice
sets. Consumers can rent in period 1, wait and purchase in period 2, or they can purchase
in period 1, (i.e., at the same time as video rental stores). Thus, consumers maximize utility
over the choices:
δs − αipr
w if purchase in period 1
ui = δs2 − αips
w if purchase in period 2
δr − αipr




w is the price of purchasing in period 1, and ps
w is the price of purchasing in period
2. The price of a rental is pr
















While the ﬁrm has more control over the relative prices of rentals and sales compared
to no price discrimination, (˜ α and ¯ α depend on pr
w and ps
w rather than a single pw), the
value of the product for purchase in period 2 is lower than in period 1. The use of market
segmentation within each period would be strictly preferred, because the ﬁrm could then
set a ﬁrst-period price for purchase in addition to the second-period purchase price and the
ﬁrst-period rental price. The third-degree price discrimination case discussed earlier is a
corner solution of the two-period market segmentation strategy in which the ﬁrm sets prices
to induce all consumers to purchase in period one. I leave a proof of the conditions under
which the corner solution with market segmentation is optimal for later, and proceed with
a comparison of the three (non-nested) cases.24
Under current U.S. copyright law, the model indicates that the decision of a ﬁrm to
use second-degree price discrimination, or no price discrimination, depends upon 1) the
decay rate of the quality of owning between the ﬁrst and second periods, 2) the distribution
period one is supported empirically.
24Note that, in the absence of market segmentation, sell-through pricing is preferred to rental-pricing
whenever the optimal second-period price exceeds the optimal ﬁrst-period price, because consumers cannot
be prevented from purchasing in the ﬁrst period, and will indeed choose to do so.
13of α, and 3) the relative qualities of renting and owning.25 In simulated results reported
in appendix A, I show that intertemporal price discrimination becomes relatively more
attractive as: the decay rate falls, the quality of owning in the second period falls relative
to the quality of owning in the ﬁrst period, or the expected value of α rises. These results
are intuitive: for example, the cost to the ﬁrm of delaying sales to the second period falls
as the decay rate falls, lowering the cost of intertemporal price discrimination and making
it more attractive. Also, if the relative value of renting is high compared to owning, there
is a stronger incentive to price discriminate between institutional and individual buyers
because institutional buyers face higher demand and are thus willing to pay more for their
rental inventories. Finally, as the average consumer price sensitivity increases (α rises)
there is greater incentive to price for the rental market, because the size of the potential
‘sell-through’ market is smaller.
4 Data
4.1 Primary Data Sources
The primary dataset used for this study is a new dataset provided by Rentrak Corporation.
Independent retailers, as well as many large retail chains, rely on Rentrak as a central source
for the provision of monitoring services in the home video industry. Monitoring through
the Rentrak system occurs for all titles in each retail location. Over 10,000 retailers used
Rentrak between 1998 and 2001, accounting for over half of all retailers in the industry.26
Mortimer (2004) uses an earlier dataset collected from Rentrak, which covers VHS
transactions during the years 1998 - 1999. In the new dataset used here, I observe both DVD
and VHS transactions at 4,341 stores from January, 2000 through June, 2002. I eliminate
2,128 stores that did not carry most major titles during the period. This eliminates stores
that either exited the database at an early date, or entered the database at a late date. This
leaves a dataset with 2,213 stores whose rental and sales transactions are recorded for each
title in each week from January 2000 to June 2002, and who have complete demographic
and phone book data.
25Conditional on the rental technology (τ).
26Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video comprise about 4,000 of these retailers, and I do not observe
their transactions. Blockbuster Video does not release their data, and only process some titles through
Rentrak’s system. Hollywood Video recently settled a lawsuit with Rentrak involving a dispute over data
integrity.
14I observe store location at the county, zip code, and Designated Market Area (DMA)
level for each of the 2,213 stores.27 For each title, I observe theatrical box-oﬃce revenues,
genre (such as Action/Adventure, Children’s, etc.), and MPAA rating (such as R, PG-13,
etc.). I focus on titles with theatrical box oﬃce revenues of at least 55 million in order
to ensure suﬃcient coverage of the sales market. I discard titles released after December,
2001 so that rental and sales activity for each title is tracked for at least 6 months on both
formats. Finally, I limit my attention to titles that are not available on revenue-sharing
contracts.28 This leaves 41 major titles in the analysis. An observation is a store-title pair,
which is constructed after summarizing over weekly transactions data; summary statistics
appear in the next section.
The Rentrak dataset is an especially rich source of information on ﬁrm behavior. How-
ever, Rentrak cannot provide information on local competitive conditions facing each store
in the database. In order to observe (or at least proxy) for local competitive conditions, I
use Yellow Pages listings for all video retail stores in the United States, including Block-
buster and Hollywood Video stores, for 2000 through 2002. From these data, I identify the
total number of video retail stores within the same zip code of each observed store in the
Rentrak database. In addition, I utilize data from the 2000 US Census on the demographic
characteristics of each zip code. Demographic data include the number of people, median
income, and marginal distributions of race, education, age, gender, employment, family sta-
tus, and the level of urbanization in each zip code. These three data sources (phone book
listings, demographics, and transactions data) are merged by zip code. When estimating
the model, I deﬁne a local market as a zip code area and use the merged data to characterize
local market conditions. Clearly, zip code areas are designed to provide convenient local
areas for the purposes of delivering mail, rather than as deﬁnitions of local markets. How-
ever, zip code areas appear to be a reasonable demarcation between markets in this setting:
the average zip code area contains approximately 24,000 people and 2.6 video retail stores.
Larger areas, such as 4-digit zip code areas or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) are
also feasible ways of attaching local demographic and business listing information, but seem
27Designated Market Areas organize the United States according to the coverage areas of broadcast tele-
vision.
28Approximately half of the major studios oﬀer revenue-sharing contracts at this time. Although I do not
observe title or studio names, I do observe that many of the remaining titles come from two studios that are
fairly large in terms of releases. The title and studio characteristics look quite representative of other titles
in the database.
15too large a market for most video store customers.
4.2 Auxiliary Data Sources
An additional step for deﬁning markets is to specify the portion of consumers that are
active in the market for either the DVD or VHS format. For this, I use data from Centris
on monthly DVD hardware penetration rates.29 Centris surveys consumers each month
on whether or not they own a DVD console, and weights each consumer survey response
according to a demographic weighting scheme. For more detail on the Centris data, see
Karaca-Mandic (2003). The Centris data begin their coverage in the late 1990’s and continue
through June 2001. I aggregate the individual surveys in each state to calculate an implied
state-level DVD hardware penetration rate. Due to the limitations of the survey size in each
month, and the noisiness of the weighting scheme, I then ﬁt a linear trend in each state across
the eighteen months of January 2000 through June 2001. I use these ﬁtted penetration rates
in each month in each state as the actual penetration rates, and I assume that they are
uniform within a state during that month.30 I assume that after a household has purchased
a DVD player, they always rent or purchase on the new DVD format, although they may
record and watch previously-purchased VHS movies on the old VCR.
The number of consumers in a market, denoted as N, takes on a value appropriate for
either the VHS or DVD market by state and month. I denote NV HS
m,q and NDV D
m,q as the
number of consumers in market m and month q that rent and purchase movies on VHS and
DVD formats respectively. The estimates of NV HS
m,q and NDV D
m,q in each market are:
NV HS
m,q = [HH · (0.90 − DV Dq)]/STORESm,y
NDV D
m,q = [HH · DV Dq]/STORESm,y
(7)
where 0.90 is the national penetration of VCRs, assumed to be constant across markets, the
variable HH is the number of households in the zipcode from the 2000 U.S. Census, and the
variable DV Dq is the penetration rate of DVD hardware in the relevant state and month.31
The variable STORESm,y is the number of video specialty stores listed in the phonebook
for that zipcode in a particular year. Typically, I observe roughly 1 of 3 stores in each
29I thank Pinar Karaca-Mandic for her help in acquiring these data.
30One would of course like to have even more detailed information on these penetration rates, but these
are the best data available to my knowledge.
31I match up titles to the monthly state penetration ﬁgures based on the month in which a title was
released. The ﬁgure for overall VCR penetration (0.90) is from the VSDA 2002 Annual Report.
16zipcode neighborhood. Unfortunately, I do not observe rentals and sales at other stores.
Dividing N by the number of stores in the market inﬂates my observed sales and rentals at
a single store to be representative of the local zip-code area, under the assumption that the
unobserved stores have the same characteristics and sales as the observed store, and that
phonebook listings represent the total population of video specialty stores.
The market for sales of VHS tapes and DVDs also includes some sales of used tapes
from stores’ rental inventories. Unfortunately, the primary data source does not record sales
transactions separately as used or new. Thus, the best deﬁnition I have for distinguishing
between new and used products is on the basis of price. I estimate wholesale price as being
equal to 60 percent of the suggested retail price. This estimate is also borne out by industry
interviews. Thus, I classify a sale as ‘used’ if the average weekly price of sales for a given
title at a particular store is below the wholesale price of a new tape. This classiﬁcation
identiﬁes approximately 80-85 percent of all sales at my observed video specialty stores as
used. I checked these estimates with professionals in the industry and with more detailed
tabulations of the phone-survey data in Table 1. For purposes of weighting the sales and
rental observations, I assume that all sales of used tapes occur through video specialty stores
(and not, for example, through mass-merchandisers like Walmart).
A ﬁnal distinction about market size relates to the fact that I only observe rental and
sales transactions from video specialty stores, and not from discount merchandisers or In-
ternet ﬁrms. Thus, I need to weight the observed rentals and sales according to the market
share of the stores in my database. For this, I use the phone-survey data described in table
1. I assume that purchases from discount merchandisers and Internet ﬁrms, etc., occur with
equal probability across zipcode areas, and that used tapes are only sold by video specialty
stores. The phone-survey data include both used and new sales. Thus, the weight in table
1 gives the weight to be applied for all sales (used plus new). In order to get the correct
weight for new sales, I calculate the total number of weighted sales, subtract used sales,
and calculate the appropriate weight for new sales. I do this for each store-title pair on
each format, using format-speciﬁc weights from table 1. Now I can write down the relevant
market size for each store-format-product as:
17NV HS
r,m,q = 0.768 · NV HS
m,q
NV HS
u,m,q = NV HS
m,q
NV HS
s,m,q = WV HS · NV HS
m,q
NDV D
r,m,q = 0.738 · NDV D
m,q
NDV D
u,m,q = NDV D
m,q
NDV D
s,m,q = WDV D · NDV D
m,q
(8)
where WV HS and WDV D are vectors of new sales weights for each store-title pair on VHS
and DVD formats respectively. This deﬁnition of market size eﬀectively weights the sample
of stores appropriately to reﬂect the national market for the upstream ﬁrm.32 It would
be wonderful to have data on new sales from other outlets, such as mass-merchandisers.
Unfortunately, I do not observe title identity, so collecting and matching such data is not
possible.
Finally, there is substantial variation across stores in the price paid for a rental or sale
by a consumer. Most stores rent and sell used tapes for the 41 titles in the analysis, and
charge diﬀerent prices. However, some stores have zero market share for new sales of a
title.33 When I observe a zero market share for new sales, I assume the local price is equal
to the suggested retail price, with the exception that rental-priced VHS titles are assigned
the wholesale price faced by a retailer before re-pricing, and they are assigned the re-priced
SRP after re-pricing.
4.3 Timing of Rentals and Sales
Table 5 provides summary statistics from the data on both the quantity and timing of
rentals and sales on both formats. For the 41 titles used in the analysis, I compute weekly
totals of rentals and sales for each title based on the ﬁrst week it appeared at a store. The
top half of the table refers to those titles with a rental priced VHS release. The bottom half
of the table refers to those titles with a sell-through priced VHS release. All titles (including
those with a rental priced VHS format) are sell-through priced on the DVD format. Of the
32I have also estimated the model assuming that sell-through priced VHS titles have the same repre-
sentation across video stores and mass merchandisers as DVDs. This does not change the results in any
meaningful way.
33An additional motivation for selecting titles with at least 55 million in theatrical box-oﬃce receipts is
that there is broad coverage of the titles across many stores. This is especially important for shares of new
sales, which are under-represented in my dataset.
1841 titles, 29 are sell-through priced (in the lower half) while 12 are rental priced (in the
top half). The left half of the table reports total rentals and sales, and cumulative monthly
rental and sales activity for the VHS format, while DVD results are reported in the right
half of the table.
I ﬁrst discuss the timing of rentals and sales, and then discuss the totals and weighted
totals for the four diﬀerent classiﬁcations of titles: rental priced VHS titles in VHS and
DVD formats, and sell-through priced VHS titles in VHS and DVD formats. Columns 1
and 4 provide information on the timing of rentals over months for VHS and DVD. Across
all four categories, approximately two-thirds of all rentals occur during the ﬁrst eight weeks
(2 months). At least 85 percent of all rentals occur in the ﬁrst 21 weeks (5 months).
Columns 2 and 5 examine used sales. Relatively few sales of used VHS tapes or DVDs
occur during the ﬁrst two months when the rental market is most active; however, by
week 21, roughly half of all used sales have occurred. I do not distinguish between the
timing of used sales for three reasons. First, unlike rentals and new sales, the sales of used
tapes are not as clearly delineated by timing. Second, the choice of whether or not to use
intertemporal price discrimination, and the eﬀects of price discrimination on producer and
consumer surplus are not likely to be aﬀected by the distinction between early and late
used sales. Finally, in table 6, there is little diﬀerence in the price of used tapes over time;
in fact, the average price of a used tape is actually higher in later months than in early
months for DVDs that were rental priced on VHS. The timing of rentals and used sales are
similar across the four quadrants of table 5.
Finally, columns 3 and 6 examine the timing of the sales of new tapes or DVDs. For
rental priced VHS titles, relatively few sales of new tapes (less than 15 percent) occur during
the ﬁrst ﬁve months. In contrast, roughly three-fourths of all new sales take place in the
ﬁrst ﬁve months for sell-through priced VHS titles, and this ﬁgure is nearly 85 percent for
all DVD titles. I classify sales occurring during the ﬁrst 5 months as “period 1 sales.” It
is straightforward to test the robustness of my estimates to perturbations in this cut-oﬀ
point. There were two reasons that I chose 5 months as the cut-oﬀ point between the two
periods of the model. First, this corresponds to the timing of the sell-through re-pricing
done by the studio for rental priced VHS titles. Second, the data seem to conform best to
this deﬁnition when one examines table 5.
Strictly speaking, the theory model described earlier predicts that 100 percent of new
19sales should occur during period 1 for DVDs and for sell-through priced VHS. The fact that
15 to 25 percent of the sales actually occur in my period 2 could reﬂect either consumers
who wanted to purchase in period 1 but found the title out of stock, or they could just reﬂect
the revealed preferences of consumers with idiosyncratic timing preferences. For example,
a consumer could be purchasing the tape for a friend’s birthday which occurs in week 25.
In estimation, I assume that consumers are just as happy purchasing these titles in period
2, and I treat the quality of the sale in these cases as being no diﬀerent from the quality of
earlier sales of the same titles. Of course, there is no way to test which of the two types
of assumptions is correct. However, the assumption is somewhat supported by examining
prices over time.
Prices of rentals and sales by month are shown in Table 6, which is also organized accord-
ing to the pricing pattern used for a ﬁlm’s VHS release. Rentals of DVDs are slightly more
expensive than VHS; there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the price of a rental according
to whether or not a ﬁlm was rental priced. This is somewhat surprising: the model predicts
that lower costs of inventory should yield lower rental prices to consumers. It seems that
99-cent children’s rentals, common in the eighties and nineties, are no longer found in the
data (and for that matter, one might expect 99-cent DVD rentals).34 I say more about this
in the discussion of retailer mark-ups later in the paper. Prices of rentals do not change
after month 5, because I aggregate rental transactions that occur after week 21 and report
the average price. Prices of used sales are also slightly higher for DVDs, and there are no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between prices of used tapes based on whether or not rental pricing
was used for a ﬁlm’s VHS release. Prices of new sales in period 1 diﬀer signiﬁcantly for
rental priced VHS tapes. Average prices during the ﬁrst ﬁve months (before sell-through
re-pricing occurs) range from $89 to $100. In contrast, prices of new sales in period 2
(months 6 and higher) average between $18 and $27. For sell-through priced VHSs and all
DVDs, prices of new sales in the second period are very similar to prices of new sales in the
ﬁrst period, although there is a small reduction in price over time.
Table 7 shows total activity levels in the data, as well as weighted totals. Most of the
sales that occur in this population of stores are sales of used tapes. The weights applied
to new sales are much larger, as I discuss in the estimation section. The ratio of total
weighted sales to total weighted rentals across the four quadrants shows a higher overall
34In the most recent update of this paper (Autumn, 2004), selected Hollywood Video and Blockbuster
retailers have introduced just such a program.
20level of weighted sales for DVDs compared to VHSs: 29.9 and 34.5 percent of rentals for
DVDs versus 13.2 and 7.5 percent of rentals for the same titles on VHS format. Note that by
comparing the diﬀerent titles on the DVD format, one should get a sense of the importance
of the endogeneity of the sell-through pricing decision. DVDs are priced the same for all
titles, so the extent to which sell-through priced titles sell better on DVD than rental priced
titles should be due to unobservable characteristics of the titles that make them relatively
more desirable to own. This diﬀerence in the ratio of sales to rentals for these sets of titles is
4.6 percent for DVDs (34.5 versus 29.9 percent). Overall levels of DVD activity (including
rentals) are higher for sell-through priced titles, but overall levels of VHS activity are higher
for rental priced titles.
Titles sell less often on the VHS format. This presumably reﬂects a relatively higher
quality attached to owning DVDs compared to VHS tapes, perhaps because of the increased
durability or ﬂexibility for playing the DVDs on laptops, etc. It could also reﬂect diﬀerences
in taste for quality across the population of consumers adopting DVD versus VHS. The
diﬀerence between rental priced titles and sell-through priced titles on the VHS format
reﬂects both unobservable diﬀerences in the desirability of owning that lead to a sell-through
or rental-pricing decision, as well as the eﬀect of delaying sales of the rental priced titles.
The diﬀerence here is quite large: sales total 13.2 percent of rentals for sell-through priced
titles, compared to 7.5 percent of rentals for rental priced titles. The diﬀerence is due to
both lower levels of rentals as well as higher levels of sales.
5 Estimation and Results
This section estimates the relevant demand and retailer parameters. Racall that in order
to address the research questions of interest, one must ﬁrst understand the factors that
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ price discrimination strategies: namely, the nature of demand, including
product qualities and consumers’ willingness to pay for quality. With estimates of these
parameters in hand, one can seek to understand the pricing policies currently in place.
The patterns of sales and rentals shown in the last section provide motivation for the
model of demand outlined earlier, in which products are vertically diﬀerentiated.35 In
35While the pricing patterns provide strong evidence for vertical diﬀerentiation across rental, used, and
new sales, the relative ranking of the outside good cannot be directly veriﬁed in the data. One could estimate
alternative demand speciﬁcations, such as a logit, or a more ﬂexible random-coeﬃcients model (such as in
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2000)) if the ranking of the outside good was of signiﬁcant
21this section, I describe the necessary extensions of the demand speciﬁcation, distributional
assumptions, and sources of identiﬁcation that are used in estimation. I use only demand-
side moment restrictions for the purpose of estimation. Supply-side information will be used
to provide additional modeling as it becomes necessary in the counterfactual experiments,
after conﬁrming a reasonable ﬁt of the model’s parameters from estimation using only the
demand-side restrictions.
5.1 Estimation and Identiﬁcation
When estimating the model of demand in section 3, I include an additional product–purchase
of a used tape–that has quality level δu ∈ (δr,δnew) where δnew takes the value δs if the title
is sell-through priced, and takes the value δs2 if the title is rental priced. In other words, I
assume that owning a used tape provides lower quality than owning a new tape, but higher
quality than a rental (for a particular title). I adopt the simple two-period model from
section 3 for two reasons. First, the pattern of rentals and sales in table 5 are generally
consistent with a two-period model as a ﬁrst-order approximation to the timing of rentals
and sales in this industry. Second, the nature of pricing in this market has always been
one in which products are either introduced immediately at one low price, or products are
introduced at a high price and are subsequently re-priced once. Thus, the model is very
much driven by the institutional details of the industry.
Empirically, a market is deﬁned to be a zipcode-title-format triple.36 A market in this
context includes three (or four) products: the rental of a title, or the purchase of a new
or used tape of a title, on either the VHS or DVD format. Thus, conditional on which
hardware they own, consumers decide whether to purchase or rent a given title in their
local zipcode. Note that the market deﬁnition implies that a studio acts as a monopolist
for a particular title, because I do not model competition across movies in the sample. An
alternative market deﬁnition might include rentals and sales of other titles released during
some deﬁned window of time. The inclusion of competing titles, although a potentially
attractive extension of the model, requires an alternative set of assumptions about the
nature of competition over time, because movies are released in diﬀerent weeks. In fact,
studios attempt to avoid competing with each others’ titles by choosing diﬀerent release
concern.
36For a discussion of the use of zipcodes to deﬁne geographic markets in this industry see Mortimer (2004).
22dates. For example, the 41 titles analyzed here are released across 108 weeks, so direct
competition between titles is softened by the staggered release schedule. Finally, I consider
two time periods for rental priced titles: before and after sell-through re-pricing.
Following the notation in Berry (1994), demand for rentals and purchases are derived
based on the consumer utility functions in section 3, where the parameter α captures the
marginal utility of income. I specify a ﬂexible Weibull distribution for α, with parameters
(λ,ρ), s.t. λ,ρ > 0, and λ ≡ exp(Z0
mγ), where Zm contains a constant term and the log of
median income. The probability density function is given by f(α) = ρλα(ρ−1) exp(−λα)ρ;
the cumulative density function is given by F(α) = 1−exp(−λα)ρ. The predicted demand
levels are calculated based on the distributional assumption for α; thus, sales (or rentals)
as a function of the model’s parameters are:



















































where the deﬁnition of market size, N is deﬁned appropriately according to the auxilliary
data discussed in section 4. For each title, we observe sales and rentals in over 2,000
geographic markets; the additional subscripts denote variation across titles and geographic
market areas. Thus, δr,m,j represents the quality level of a rental of title j in market
m. Furthermore, suppressing additional notation, δr,m,j,δu,m,j and δs,m,j are assumed to
represent the quality levels of the appropriate format for title j, so that δr,m,j takes the
value δv
r,m,j and δd
r,m,j for VHS and DVD formats respectively.
I assume that purchases of new sell-through priced VHS tapes and DVDs occur in period
1. However, if a title is rental priced on the VHS format, the sales share is divided between
sales in the ﬁrst period and sales in the second period. In this case, new sales are predicted
by the model’s parameters as:


























23where ps2,m,j is the price of a sale in the second period. Using the distributional assumptions
for α, I can rewrite equation 9 in terms of the quality parameters. This produces local
estimates of movie quality which are of the form:
δr,m,j = pr,m,j[−ln(s0,m,j) · exp(−Zmγ)]−(1/ρ) (11)
for a rental; similar expressions are solved recursively for the quality of used and new
purchases (δu,m,j and δs,m,j). Once again, the quality parameters take values of δr,m,j,δu,m,j
and δs,m,j that are format-speciﬁc (VHS or DVD). Local market shares are denoted by s0,m,j,
etc., and are deﬁned as
q0,m,j
N using the relevant value of N according to equation 8. The
quality parameters for rental priced VHS titles are solved similarly to incorporate period 1
and period 2 sales.
The market-speciﬁc quality of a title-use-format is decomposed as follows:
δr,m,j = δr,j + Xmβj + ξr,m,j, for rentals, and
δs,m,j = δs,j + Xmβj + ξs,m,j, for new sales,
(12)
and the quality of used tapes or second-period sales are similarly deﬁned. The term δr,j
denotes the national average quality of a rental of the movie, and δs,j denotes the national
average quality of a purchase. The term Xmβj denotes the market-speciﬁc quality of all uses
of title j in market m and allows for horizontal diﬀerentiation across geographic markets
for diﬀerent movie titles on the basis of observables. Note that the eﬀect of any observable
Xm is allowed to diﬀer across movie titles. For example, movie j may be more valuable
both as a rental and as a purchase in market m because it appeals to local demographics.
Local demographic shifters (Xm) include the percent of the area that is suburban, store
size, the percent of families who are married with kids, and the local DVD penetration rate,
which is measured at the state level in each month. Finally, ξ·,m,j captures the unobserved
quality of a title-use-format in market m. For example, a rental of title j may be more
valuable in market m because of unobservable promotions or community events. Prices
vary by market (pr,m,j, etc.) and also apply separately to VHS and DVD formats (thus,
they have a suppressed v or d superscript similar to the quality variables).
Instruments
The ξ·,m,j terms contain all unobserved characteristics of a use (such as rental or sale)
of title j in market m. The unobserved attributes may be correlated with the local retail
24price, p·,m,j, and any such correlation will bias the estimate of γ. I instrument for price
using the retailer’s average cost for the title-use-format combination. The variable cost of
a rental is given by the wholesale price of a tape divided by the number of rentals per tape
for that store-title pair. The wholesale price assumes a 40 percent discount oﬀ the observed
suggested retail price of each videocassette tape or DVD.37
Thus, variation in retailers’ average costs of rentals arises because of variation in τ: some
retailers purchase 10 tapes and produce 100 rentals from them, while others purchase 10
tapes and produce 200 rentals from them. In order for retailer cost to be a valid instrument,
this variation cannot be under the control of the retailer. One possibility is that retailers
cannot anticipate the number of rentals that each unit of inventory will produce.38 Another
possibility is that retailers–even if they can anticipate a lower or higher inventory usage
rate–cannot control this rate for an individual title, conditional on the cost of inventory.39
Both assumptions seem reasonable, especially for the large ‘blockbuster’ titles analyzed
here. For used sales, I use the total rental inventory that the retailer ordered for title j
less one unit, which is by deﬁnition his available supply of the used product. The average
cost for a new sale of title j depends only on the wholesale price, which does not vary
across retailers. Therefore, I interact the wholesale price paid by retailers with the observed
competitive conditions in their local market, which consist of three variables: the number
of video stores in the same zipcode, and the numbers of Blockbuster and Hollywood Video
store locations in the zipcode.
One can now use equation 12 to form moment conditions:
E(W0ξr,m,j) = 0 (13)
where W includes Zm and the instrumental variables (i.e., retailer costs). The parameters
to be estimated are: θ ≡ (δr,δu,δs,δs2,β,γ). The parameters δr,δu, and δs are all vectors
of length J (the number of titles), while δs2 has length equal to the number of rental priced
37The wholesale discount ﬁgure was obtained through interviews with studio executives and video retail
owners. Other discounts (such as volume discounts, bundling discounts, or other ‘copy-depth’ programs may
also apply. I assume that retailers pay the usual wholesale price when reselling tapes, but get a 20 percent
discount on rental inventories that are acquired under rental-pricing contracts. These ﬁgures were derived
from consultations with industry executives; the results are robust to reasonable alternative assumptions on
these costs (such as the removal or extension of the additional 20 percent discount.)
38See Mortimer (2004) for a similar treatment of this variable, which allows for uncertainty from the
retailer’s point of view in τ.
39Note that competition in the retail market will also set τ if consumers value earlier availability of a
movie rental.
25titles.
Estimation proceeds using generalized method of moments, choosing θ to minimize













where ψ(θ,Wi) is the set of moment conditions, i is now used to denote format-title-use
observations, and A is a weight matrix chosen to minimize variance according to Hansen
(1982). Estimation is simpliﬁed by using a two-step procedure. I ﬁrst guess values for the δ
and β vectors, then minimize the objective function over values of γ and ρ. Given the new
values of γ and ρ, I construct ﬁtted values of δ·,m,j’s, which I can regress on title-use-format
dummies and the Xm’s to recover new estimates of the δ and β vectors. I iterate this
procedure until convergence.
The parameters of the distribution of α (γ and ρ) are identiﬁed from variation in the
instruments, as well as variation in income across geographic markets, while the quality
parameters are identiﬁed oﬀ of title-use-format dummies and local demographic character-
istics. As utility functions are ordinal, rather than cardinal, I normalize the value of the
outside good for movie 1 on the VHS format such that E(Xmβ1) = 0.45.40
5.2 Estimation Results
Table 8 provides estimates of the parameters of the model. Rather than report 41 sets of
quality parameters (one set for each title), I report means of the parameter estimates for
each of the four format-pricing types (i.e., VHS and DVD formats, based on whether the
VHS format was rental priced or sell-through priced.)
The β parameters aﬀect the ‘local quality’ or local taste for movies, across all uses of
a title. Larger stores are located in neighborhoods where a higher overall utility exists for
movie watching regardless of format (the average β associated with store size is positive).
A higher proportion of “families that are married with children” is associated with a lower
overall utility of movie watching on the VHS format, but with a higher overall utility of
movie watching on the DVD format although this varies by movie and genre. Surburban
40This was calculated by setting α = 1, computing the δ·,m,j’s, and then regressing δ·,m,j on use dummies
and Xm. The vector β1 from this regression (i.e., the value of the beta vector for title 1, on VHS) was then
used to normalize the outside good in each market for title 1. This was done to preserve geographic variation
in the normalization for title 1. Normalizing the value of β1 to be zero would give the same value of the
outside good for all geographic markets. My method normalizes β1 to be equal to some vector of non-zero
constants.
26areas are estimated to receive lower relative utility on the DVD format compared to their
non-suburban counterparts. This eﬀect is often not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. DVD hardware penetration rates are strongly correlated with tastes for movie watch-
ing. When examining the market for movies on the VHS format, neighborhoods with higher
DVD penetration are estimated to have higher overall utility from movie consumption. In
contrast, neighborhoods with higher DVD penetration are estimated to have lower overall
utility from movie consumption on the DVD format. This is consistent with an adoption
pattern of DVD hardware in which high-value consumers adopt early. Finally, the param-
eters of the distribution of α indicate that neighborhoods with higher median income are
associated with a higher willingness to pay for movies on tape or DVD (γ1 = 0.87).
The quality parameters indicate that DVD is typically of higher average quality than
VHS. People in the market for DVDs are estimated to have higher utility from movie
watching than people in the market for VHS, for the set of titles that are sell-through
priced on the VHS format, based on the average value of Xβ. For the set of titles that were
rental priced on the VHS format, the average values of Xβ are essentially the same on the
two formats. The product-use dummies are higher for the DVD format for titles that were
rental priced on the VHS format (based on the average value of δ·,j’s. Perhaps surprisingly,
some titles that were sell-through priced on the VHS format are estimated to have slightly
lower average quality on the DVD format, compared to the VHS format. This is primarily
driven by lower quality estimates for children’s titles.41 I ﬁnd evidence that the relative
quality of owning, as compared to renting, is higher for the DVD format. The set of movies
for which the VHS format was rental priced are of average higher quality than the set of
sell-through priced movies. This holds for both formats.42 The decay rate for the quality
of a purchase is estimated as the ratio of the quality of a purchase in the second period
and the quality of a purchase in the ﬁrst period for rental priced VHS titles, and is 0.89 on
average.
Table 8 also reports values for the parameters τ and µ, which are essentially backed-out
from the data directly. The τ parameter is the ratio of rentals to inventory, and diﬀers
considerably across the two pricing regimes. Table 8 indicates that VHS inventory is used
41Anecdotally, trade press articles cite the ease of use of the VHS format for children as one course of this
diﬀerence, because VHS tapes can be inserted into a machine and automatically played without the need to
press any additional buttons.
42The one exception is used sales of rental priced VHS tapes, which are used more intensively in the rental
market before being sold.
27more intensively for titles that are rental priced, producing 23.7 rentals per tape compared
to 16.9 rentals per tape for sell-through priced titles. DVDs show almost no diﬀerence in the
rental technology across the two sets of titles, producing 15.6 and 15.3 rentals respectively.
The µ parameter is estimated as the diﬀerence between the observed retail price, and the
observed variable cost of the rental. Retail mark-ups are higher for the sell-through priced
VHS titles and for DVDs: around $2 compared to $-0.01 for rental priced titles on the VHS
format, and between $0.40 and $0.90 for both sets of titles on the DVD format. Sales mark-
ups by retailers are around $40 in the ﬁrst period for rental priced VHS, but are around $4
after re-pricing. Mark-ups in the ﬁrst period for sell-through priced VHS and titles on the
DVD format range from $8 - $10. The retailer mark-up on sales of used tapes is assumed
to be equal to the price, with no proceeds going to the upstream ﬁrm.43
6 Counterfactual Experiments and Welfare Analysis of Copyright Law
Using the estimated demand model I examine the welfare implications of price discrimina-
tion under current U.S. and E.U. copyright law in three steps. First, I examine the welfare
implications of the two pricing regimes (rental pricing and sell-through pricing) currently
observed under U.S. copyright law. Second, I examine the welfare implications of a shift
to E.U. copyright law allowing for third-degree price discrimination. Third, I examine the
future optimal DVD pricing strategy under U.S. copyright law and the welfare implicatons
of E.U. copyright law as DVD hardware adoption continues to supplant VCRs in the future.
In order to undertake the ﬁrst step, I use the estimated parameters in table 8 to predict
market shares, variable proﬁts for studios and retailers, and consumer surplus assuming that
studios choose the price or prices that maximize their proﬁt on each title. I then recalculate
market shares, variable proﬁts and consumer surplus under the assumption that studios
adopt the “other” pricing regime in each of the four groups of title-format pairs, allowing
for the studio’s optimal price under the alternative regime. That is, I examine the outcomes
if rental priced titles were instead sell-through priced and vice versa. This counterfactual
yields the welfare implications of alternative pricing strategies under U.S. copyright law.
To examine the welfare implications of a switch to E.U. copyright law, I perform the
same calculation as above, but allow studios to directly charge diﬀerent prices in the rental
and sales markets. In priciple, one might also be interested in the eﬀects of a policy that
43Both τ and µ need to be modeled in any counterfactual analyses. I discuss this in the next section.
28uses both market-segmentation and intertemporal price discrimination. Although studios
are not observed doing this in the E.U., there would be no legal restrictions barring it under
the E.U. copyright law. Finally, for step three I predict whether or not sell-through pricing
of DVD will continue in the future under U.S. copyright law as DVD hardware adoption
continues, and what implications if any this would have on the welfare eﬀects of switching
to E.U. copyright law. To accomplish this, I perform the same calculations as above, but
apply the DVD coeﬃcients on local quality to the VHS market. The exercise supposes
that continued adoption of DVD hardware will expand DVD rental and sales activity into
markets that currently serve only VHS users, but that the DVD quality parameters do not
change. The point of this exercise is to estimate the eﬀects for ﬁrms and consumers of price
discrimination in the context of the evolution of a new technology.
There are several explanations for the current pricing of titles on the DVD format. The
DVD format may represent a permanent shift in the nature of the ‘packaged good’ movie
product. If the quality of renting or buying, or the relative quality of these uses, is much
higher for the DVD format, changes in the distribution of consumer tastes are unlikely to
aﬀect the optimal pricing strategy. As described in the previous section and in table 8, it
does appear to be the case that there is a larger diﬀerence in the quality of buying versus
renting for the DVD format than for the VHS format. The change in pricing should lead
to a decline of the rental industry and a very diﬀerent form of distribution for this segment
of the motion picture industry. Another explanation is that the current pricing strategy of
DVDs functions as an introductory pricing mechanism. In this case, high-value consumers,
and not the relative diﬀerence in purchasing and renting qualities, drive the pricing decision.
Thus, changes in the distribution of consumer tastes that results from hardware evolution
should lead to a DVD pricing strategy that mimics the strategy used for VHS and preserves
the heavy reliance upon a rental market. Yet another possible explanation for the diﬀerent
pricing of DVDs is that the rate of decay of sales quality is diﬀerent under this format.
If this rate of decline in quality is much faster for DVDs, sell-through pricing would be
optimal.
6.1 Additional Modeling for Counterfactual Exercises
Retailer Markups and Inventory Use
The pricing strategies outlined here are non-nested cases: depending on the values of
29the structural parameters, a ﬁrm might prefer sell-through pricing to rental pricing, or vice
versa. Although rental pricing involves price discrimination and sell-through pricing does
not, price discrimination under rental pricing is achieved only at the cost of destroying
some of the value of the sales product through the decay of quality. Similarly, a ﬁrm might
prefer rental pricing to market segmentation (or “EU pricing”), or vice versa, since EU
pricing is assumed to not give the ﬁrm the ability to discriminate intertemporally. The
only nested pricing strategy is that a ﬁrm should always be able to replicate the results
of sell-through pricing under an EU pricing strategy, since the two prices set under EU
pricing can always be chosen to mimic a sell-through pricing strategy. These predictions
are true holding all parameter values ﬁxed. However, as already noted, the values of the
retailer-level parameters diﬀer considerably across titles according to pricing type. Rental
priced VHS titles have much lower retailer mark-ups empirically than sell-through priced
titles (a lower µr), and they are used more intensively (a higher τ).
There are two choices for how to handle changes in µ and τ. On one hand, one could
write down a model of retailer competition in which τ and µ are determined endogenously.
One challenge with this approach is that many of the observable competitive conditions at
the retail level do not change across pricing types.
Alternatively, one could adopt a less complete model of retailer competition, but use the
rich structure of the data to predict changes in µ and τ empirically under counterfactual
upstream pricing strategies. The beneﬁt of this approach is that it retains the focus on the
upstream pricing decisions and allows for considerable ﬂexibility within the current set of
prices that are observed. It also allows for ﬂexibility across retailers that diﬀer according
to unobservable characteristics, but which have the same observable characteristics. The
main drawback to this approach is that, while it may give quite accurate predictions about
changes in µ and τ for pricing contracts that are observed, it is less informative about
changes in µ and τ for prices for which we have no observations. In other words, out-of-
sample predictions are more constrained. I adopt the second method. The reduced-form
model for changes in µ and τ that result from new pricing strategies at the upstream level
is as follows.
For µ, I assume that each retailer receives the average markup observed for its “other”
priced movies when examining the eﬀects of the “other” pricing strategy. For example, for
a rental of title j at store k, I regress:
30µrjk = µ0,rkRP + µ1,rkSTP + rjk (14)
Then, for retailer k, I use ˆ µ0,rk for counterfactual exercises examining outcomes of a
rental pricing strategy for titles that were actually priced for sell-through. Similarly, I use
ˆ µ1,rk for counterfactual exercises examining outcomes of a sell-through pricing strategy for
titles that were actually rental priced. An analogous approach identiﬁes markups of sales.
Thus,
µsjk = µ0,skRP + µ1,skSTP + ζsjk (15)
gives counterfactual markups for sales. In addition to modeling retailer markups, I allow for
a change in the intensity of inventory use under the counterfactual pricing regime. This is
due to the diﬀerence in the cost of a tape for downstream retailers. In a method analogous
to that used for retailer markups, I regress
τjk = τ0,kRP + τ1,kSTP + ηjk (16)
to give counterfactual inventory use.44 One could incorporate other variables in these
predictions to allow for a smoother mapping over prices. For example, one could regress µ
and τ on pricing indicators as well as on actual wholesale prices. In all of these methods, I
assume that the regressors are orthogonal to the error terms.
Second Period Quality
In addition to retailer parameters, the quality of a second-period purchase must be
estimated for sell-through priced titles, since I do not have any data on actual second-
period purchases for those titles that would identify this quality level directly. The results
in table 9 use an estimate of second-period quality that is constructed as follows. The
average diﬀerence between the ﬁrst-period new purchase quality and the used purchase
quality is estimated for each genre from the 12 rental priced titles in the top panel.45 I then
calculate the percentage split represented by the second-period purchase quality for these
44I have also performed a number of robustness tests, such as calculating the average increase in inventory
use for the two pricing regimes, and applying that to each store’s actual τ for each title. The average increase
is around three (i.e., stores produce three times as many rentals from each tapes for rental-pricing titles,
compared to sell-through priced titles). The results are not aﬀected in any meaningful way.
45For children’s titles, I used PG-rated “family” movies, which are primarily directed at the children’s
market.
31titles, and apply that percentage to the sell-through priced titles in the second panel. For
example, if rental-priced dramas have average used, period 2, and period 1 qualities of 1,
1.5, and 2, respectively, and a sell-through priced drama (say, title j) has used and period
1 qualities of 2 and 4, then the period 2 quality assigned to title j is 3. I have tried several
robustness tests of this assumption, and none of them change the results in any meaningful
way.46
Durable Goods and Used Markets
Finally, the demand for used tapes highlights an important issue for producers of durable
goods. I assume in the counterfactual exercises that the market for used tapes is constrained
by the level of inventory purchased by retailers. Thus, I assume that retailers can only sell
used tapes up to the level of their inventory, less one tape to keep for future rental business.
In many cases, this leads to rationing of used tapes. This eﬀect is quite interesting, as it
highlights the importance of price discrimination in markets for durable goods where an
upstream ﬁrm does not control the second-hand market.
6.2 Welfare Analyses
The results of the counterfactual exercises are contained in tables 9 - 11. I start with table 9,
in which the ﬁrst two columns give actual and estimated market shares for the VHS format.
The table is divided into two panels, according to whether or not a title’s VHS release
was rental or sell-through priced. The ﬁrst column lists actual prices, market shares, and
variable proﬁts for upstream and downstream ﬁrms. The reported proﬁts are the average
variable proﬁts for a title, assuming that mark-ups and prices in the unobserved stores in
each market are the same as the mark-ups and prices I do observe. Actual market shares
are around 25 to 29 percent for rentals of titles on VHS. Column 2 of table 9 solves for
the optimal monopoly price, given the parameter values. In the top panel, covering rental
priced VHS titles, The optimal price is estimated to be slightly lower than the actual price
for this set of titles, with slightly higher proﬁts to the studio and to retailers. Overall, the
estimated prices indicate a reasonably good ﬁt to the data, although the estimated market
share of rentals is higher than the actual. In the bottom panel, covering sell-through priced
VHS titles, estimated prices and market shares are quite close to the actual, implying that
46It is straightforward to bound this parameter, because the second-period quality is presumably greater
than the used quality and less than the period-one new quality.
32the demand model is predicting the data quite well. Subsequent comparisons will be to
these results in column two.
Column 3 of table 9 gives predicted market shares and proﬁts under the “other” pric-
ing regime. For the ﬁrst panel of table 9, which contains rental-priced movies, this corre-
sponds to the adoption of sell-through pricing. I again solve for the optimal wholesale price.
Markups and inventory use are modeled as described in the previous section. At these pa-
rameter values, the use of sell-through pricing results in a 24 percent reduction in proﬁts for
the studio. Retailers would be slightly (4 percent) better oﬀ under this pricing regime, and
consumers would be worse oﬀ under this scenario, with consumer surplus falling roughly
29 percent. In the panel of table 9 that covers sell-through priced titles, the third column
corresponds to counterfactual outcomes under rental pricing. Both studios and retailers
are worse oﬀ under rental pricing for this set of titles. This is consistent with reports in
industry trade journals and interviews about the expected eﬀects of rental pricing for such
movies. Consumers are better oﬀ. Note the eﬀects of rental pricing strategies to limit the
size of the used market. Studios receive no revenues from these sales, and price new tapes in
order to shrink the supply of used tapes under the rental pricing strategy. The shrinking of
this market also occurs because video stores are assumed to use inventories more intensively
under rental pricing, thus carrying smaller inventories that can subsequently be re-sold.
Column 4 of table 9 gives results under market segmentation, similar to the pricing
policies followed by these same studios in countries with EU-type copyright laws. Under
this counterfactual, studios are allowed to charge diﬀerent prices to retailers and consumers
on the ﬁrst day of a movie’s release to the video market, but I assume they do not engage
in intertemporal price discrimination. I adopt parameter values of µr and τ that are appro-
priate to rental pricing in this exercise. I estimate that market segmentation makes studios
and retailers worse oﬀ compared to rental pricing in the ﬁrst panel. Consumer surplus de-
creases by 23 percent. Column 4 in the second panel shows a positive eﬀect for studios and
consumers under EU-type pricing, although retailers receive lower proﬁts than they would
have under rental-pricing.
Table 10 provides the same results for the DVD format. The comparison between the
ﬁrst two columns indicates a good ﬁt of the model. Results of the experiment of adopting
rental pricing for DVDs are shown in column three. Studios and retailers are estimated
to be worse oﬀ under rental pricing for both groups of titles, although consumers beneﬁt.
33Column four allows for EU-type pricing. Studios are estimated to increase their proﬁts
by about 30 to 50 percent under this pricing regime compared to the current sell-through
pricing strategy. Consumers also beneﬁt signiﬁcantly under this policy. On the other hand,
the use of market segmentation is estimated to make retailers worse oﬀ. Anecdotally, the
average predicted prices under this scenario ($33 for retailers and $22 for consumers for
the set of sell-through priced titles) are very close to some actual prices charged for recent
sell-through priced DVD releases in the U.K.. For example, Garﬁeld - The Movie, with
U.S. theatrical box-oﬃce receipts of $75 million, was released in the U.K. recently at prices
of £15.99 and £11.99, or $30.74 and $23.05, for retailers and individuals respectively.
Table 11 examines the outcomes among current VHS participants under the assumption
that everyone in the VHS market eventually adopts DVD technology. The outcomes are
calculated by replacing the product quality parameters for each title-use pair under the
VHS format with the quality parameters for the same title-use appropriate to the DVD
format. Retailer mark-ups are assumed to be unchanged compared to the values in the
equivalent columns in table 9, as are consumers’ tastes for all uses of a movie (i.e., the β
parameters). Production costs for the studio are adjusted to reﬂect production costs for
DVDs. The results in table 11 indicate that as the VHS market adopts DVD technology,
rental-pricing becomes a more proﬁtable strategy for the studio, compared to sell-through
pricing. Despite the higher estimated quality of the DVD technology for owning compared
to renting movies, the population that was using VHS technology in 2000 and 2001 diﬀers
from their DVD counterparts in the overall utility that it receives from watching movies
(the β’s). As a result, studio proﬁts are estimated to be 42 percent higher under a rental-
pricing strategy for the group of titles that were rental priced on VHS. Studio proﬁts are
also estimated to be 49 percent higher under a rental-pricing strategy for titles that were
sell-through priced on VHS. Retailers are worse oﬀ under the rental pricing regime than
they would be under continued sell-through pricing policies, while consumers are made
better oﬀ by the adoption of rental pricing. For the ﬁrst group of titles (i.e., those that
were rental priced on the VHS format), EU pricing leads to higher studio proﬁts than the
proﬁts expected with no price discrimination. However, for the set of titles that were rental
priced on the VHS format, intertemporal price discrimination is more proﬁtable than the
third degree price discrimination used under EU pricing. EU pricing leaves retailers with
lower proﬁts than they would have earned under a sell-through pricing regime. Consumers
34beneﬁt from a shift from sell-through pricing to EU pricing.
7 Conclusion
Firms respond strategically to the legal restrictions imposed upon them, and consumers
may be made better or worse oﬀ by these actions. As a result, giving additional control
to a copyright holder may increase or decrease consumer surplus, and may also aﬀect pro-
ducer surplus for ﬁrms that use copyrighted goods as inputs (e.g., retailers). To identify
factors inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ optimal responses to U.S. copyright law, I empirically examine the
outcomes of two pricing strategies used by ﬁrms for products that are identical in content,
but distributed via diﬀerent technologies. Using a new dataset covering the distribution of
movies on VHS and DVD formats, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms consistently choose the more proﬁtable
pricing strategy across titles and formats.
I address three issues. First, I examine the welfare eﬀects of the current price discrimi-
nation strategies used by ﬁrms in the U.S., and ﬁnd that intertemporal price discrimination
beneﬁts consumers but harms retailers. Second, I estimate the welfare eﬀects of an al-
ternative form of copyright protection currently used in the E.U., allowing for the price
discrimination strategy that would be optimal under that alternative. I ﬁnd that price
discrimination under this law also tends to beneﬁt studios and consumers at the expense
of retailers, but this does not hold for movies that are currently intertemporally priced.
Third, I consider the potential future eﬀects of current and alternative copyright laws as
ﬁrms respond to changes in the composition of DVD owners over time. I ﬁnd that E.U.-style
copyright protection allows for a more proﬁtable pricing strategy by copyright holders on
some titles, and that consumers beneﬁt when this price discrimination strategy is chosen.
Future research could examine the eﬀects of intertemporal price discrimination in con-
junction with revenue-sharing contracts. Such contracts were widely used for rental priced
movies on the VHS format in the late 90s, and could aﬀect social welfare in future if in-
tertemporal price discrimination were adopted for DVDs. Understanding the eﬀects of
pricing strategies in a simpler setting provides a foundation for analyses of more compli-
cated supply contracts. If intertemporal price discrimination is proﬁtable in the absence of
non-linear contracts, the use of such contracts should make it even more attractive for copy-
right holders. By reducing some of the ineﬃciencies of intertemporal price discrimination,
revenue-sharing may help to mitigate welfare losses due to copyright restrictions.
35Appendix A: Optimal Price Discrimination Strategies
For the cases outlined in section 3, one can estimate prices, market shares (for the
purchase and rental products of a title), ﬁrm proﬁts, and consumer surplus if the parameters
(N,τ,c,δs,δs2,δr) and any parameters of the distribution of α are known (along with retail
mark-ups, which we have so far been assuming to be zero). To provide a simple example
of the upstream ﬁrm’s pricing decision, I solve the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization problem over
a range of parameter values and provide a graph showing the values over which rental-
pricing or sell-through pricing strategies are optimal. For this example, I assume that
1/α has a Weibull distribution with parameters (λ,ρ) and retailer mark-ups are zero (i.e.,
µr = µs = 0). I assume there is a single upstream ﬁrm and a single, price-taking retailer.
I also assume N = 1,c = 2,δs = 1.6, and ρ = 2.9. I solve for the optimal pricing strategy
over a range of values for λ and δr assuming that the upstream ﬁrm eﬀectively cannot
use third-degree price discrimination. I consider a few alternative assumptions about the
parameters τ and δs2, which are discussed shortly.47 The values of λ that I consider range
from 0.17 to 0.40, implying a mean value of 1/α of 1.1 to 0.23, respectively for the given
value of ρ. The values of δr that I consider range from 1/7th of the value of owning to
2/3rds of the value of owning.48
Results are shown in ﬁgure 1 for three alternative speciﬁcations of τ and δs2. The area
down and to the left of each line represents the values of λ and δr for which the upstream
ﬁrm prefers rental pricing to sell-through pricing. Starting with the solid line (closest to
the lower left-hand corner), I show the results when τ = 20 and δs2 = 0.90δs. When the
relative quality of renting versus owning is high (so that consumers get a large part of the
value of a movie by seeing it one time), rental-pricing is preferred. For a “high enough”
δr (relative to δs), rental-pricing is preferred over a large range of E(1/α). However, as
E(1/α) becomes large, rental-pricing is no longer preferred. When the market has many
low-value consumers, or when renting is a relatively high-quality good compared to owning,
rental-pricing is the ﬁrm’s most proﬁtable strategy. On the other hand, when the value of
47In the empirical work, I relax many of these modeling assumptions; for example, I allow for greater
variation in τ, and I estimate retailer mark-ups.
48I show results for discrete changes in λ (increments of 0.1) and δr (it decreases from δs/1.5 to δs/7.0 in
increments of 0.5 in the denominator).
36owning is a large multiple of the value of renting (perhaps because consumers watch the
movie many times), a sell-through strategy is preferred. This accords well with the casual
evidence that ﬁrms nearly always use sell-through pricing strategies for children’s movies,
and Blockbuster hits.
The next closest dotted line in ﬁgure 1 shows the parameter values for which rental-
pricing is preferred when inventories are used diﬀerently under the two pricing strategies.
Retailers are still assumed to have no mark-ups for this simple example, but I allow for the
fact that inventories may be used more intensively when a movie is rental priced. As this
is an empirical regularity in the industry, I assume that sell-through priced movies produce
20 rentals from each tape, while rental priced movies produce 30 rentals from each tape.
There are two potential eﬀects here: one is that the constraint on the relative price of a
rental, compared to the price of a purchase, diﬀers as a function of τ. The other is that
the cost of producing a rental is lower. Whether or not diﬀerent values of τ make rental or
sell-through pricing more attractive is essentially an empirical question. In this example,
there is a slightly wider range of parameters over which the ﬁrm will choose rental-pricing.
Finally, in the outermost dotted line, I show the results when τ diﬀers in the same way as
above, but δs2 = 0.95δs rather than 0.90δs. More patient consumers (a higher δs2) results
in rental pricing being preferred over a larger set of values for λ and δr: if consumers are
more patient, there is not as much to lose by delaying the introduction of the good to the
purchase market.









τRP = 30,τSTP = 20,δs2 = 0.95δs
τRP = 30,τSTP = 20,δs2 = 0.90δs
τRP = 20,τSTP = 20,δs2 = 0.90δs
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40Table 1: Market Shares of Alternative Distribution Channels: Rentals and Sales*
Retail Outlet VHS VHS DVD DVD
Rental Sales Rental Sales
Video Specialty 76.8% 22.9% 73.8% 10.0% (1)
Other brick&mortar/ 23.2 10.7 17.1 30.0 (2)
grocery stores, etc.
Internet (Netﬂix, etc.) 0 1.9 9.1 10.0
Discount merchandiser 0 55.1 0 40.0 (3)
(i.e., Walmart, etc)
Other (direct mail, etc) 0 9.4 0 10.0
*Data Source: Alexander and Associates. Sales tabulations reﬂect activity for the second
quarter of 2002; rental tabulations reﬂect activity for May 2002.
(1) Includes Blockbuster at 7 percent (mostly pre-viewed DVDs) and an allowance for other
video specialty stores.
(2) Includes Best Buy at 20 percent, Circuit City at 5 percent, and an allowance for others
at 5 percent.
(3) Includes Walmart at 29 percent, Target at 8 percent, and an allowance for others at 3
percent.
41Table 2: All A and B Titles Released on VHS, Jan 00 - Dec 01*
% VHS ST priced Total Released
Genre A B A B
Act/Adv 22.2 0.0 27 11
Child/Fam 100.0 100.0 13 4
Comedy 29.4 2.7 34 37
Drama 15.8 0.0 19 24
Horror/Sus 0.0 0.0 17 15
Romance 0.0 0.0 4 5
Sci-Fi 75.0 16.7 4 6
Total 29.4 5.9 118 102
Table 3: All A and B Titles Released on DVD, Jan 00 - Dec 01*
% DVD ST priced Total Released
Genre A B A B
Act/Adv 100.0 100.0 27 11
Child/Fam 100.0 100.0 12 2
Comedy 100.0 100.0 27 37
Drama 100.0 96.0 19 25
Horror/Sus 100.0 100.0 13 16
Romance 100.0 100.0 4 5
Sci-Fi 100.0 100.0 4 7
Total 100.0 99.0 106 103
*Tabulations compiled by author using data from Rentrak Corporation. A titles grossed at
least 40 million dollars in theatrical revenues. B titles grossed between 15 and 40 million
dollars in theatrical revenues. Table includes all A and B titles released during the relevant
time period, including those available on revenue-sharing terms.
42Table 4: Empirical Evidence on the Growth of DVD
(in millions) 1999 2000 2001
DVD Households (1) 12 24
Total Expenditures:
DVD Rentals (2) 300 569 1,400
DVD Sales (3) 1,300 3,200 5,300
Growth Rate over Previous Year
DVD Rentals (2) 90% 146%
DVD Sales (3) 146% 66%
Expenditures in my data
DVD Rentals (4) 9.7 43.0
DVD Sales (4) 0.6 5.1
(1) VSDA 2002 Annual Report, pg. 3. Source: Kagan World Media;
www.adamsmediaresearch.com.
(2) VSDA 2002 Annual Report, pg. 3. Source: Vidtrac; www.adamsmediaresearch.com.
(3) VSDA 2002 Annual Report, pg. 13. Source: Adams Media Research.
(4) Author’s calculations. (2000-2001 New Releases, Sample Stores Only)
43Table 5: Timing of Rentals and Sales: Cumulative Percentages by Month
VHS DVD
Rentals Used Sales New Sales Rentals Used Sales New Sales
Panel 1: Rental Priced Titles (N = 12):
Month 1 39.9 0.3 3.0 44.7 7.7 23.4
Month 2 62.2 1.2 7.5 63.6 20.8 46.1
Month 3 77.2 14.7 11.0 75.1 37.9 66.7
Month 4 83.7 29.6 13.3 80.3 48.3 76.6
Month 5 88.1 44.4 14.7 84.8 56.7 83.2
Month 6 94.7 57.1 37.5 93.3 71.3 90.9
Month 7 100.0 69.6 74.4 100.0 84.2 94.5
Month 8 100.0 79.5 89.4 100.0 91.4 96.2
Months 9+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel 2: Sell-through Priced Titles (N = 29):
Month 1 44.1 1.8 50.1 44.4 5.9 17.4
Month 2 65.8 15.7 60.3 64.3 20.6 34.3
Month 3 76.9 38.5 65.2 77.7 42.2 61.3
Month 4 85.1 54.1 69.2 83.8 55.7 74.8
Month 5 88.1 65.8 71.4 88.2 67.6 84.2
Month 6 94.7 75.3 90.1 94.7 79.5 91.3
Month 7 100.0 84.6 95.7 100.0 87.3 94.1
Month 8 100.0 92.8 98.2 100.0 93.5 96.4
Months 9+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
44Table 6: Monthly Average Prices of Rentals and Sales
VHS DVD
Rentals Used Sales New Sales Rentals Used Sales New Sales
Panel 1: Rental Priced Titles (N = 12):
Month 1 3.00 11.84 97.74 3.04 8.45 16.87
Month 2 3.03 7.81 100.44 3.18 9.10 16.48
Month 3 3.01 7.92 97.65 3.29 8.33 16.53
Month 4 2.97 9.15 88.60 3.28 9.02 16.27
Month 5 3.03 8.44 96.40 3.23 9.28 15.60
Month 6 2.72 7.05 19.23 2.78 9.79 14.85
Month 7 2.72 6.29 18.80 2.78 9.93 14.90
Month 8 2.72 5.72 18.27 2.78 9.18 14.60
Months 9+ 2.72 5.98 26.68 2.78 9.57 15.47
Panel 2: Sell-through Priced Titles (N = 29):
Month 1 3.01 7.79 17.48 3.05 10.40 19.50
Month 2 3.17 7.70 18.85 3.53 11.36 17.08
Month 3 3.18 7.36 20.30 3.67 11.27 15.67
Month 4 3.15 7.11 18.47 3.86 10.96 15.47
Month 5 3.12 7.00 18.34 3.80 10.87 14.60
Month 6 2.74 6.42 13.53 3.09 9.87 13.23
Month 7 2.74 6.41 14.34 3.09 9.87 14.01
Month 8 2.74 6.29 14.24 3.09 9.46 12.54
Months 9+ 2.74 6.00 15.19 3.09 9.87 11.61
45Table 7: Weighted Quantities of Rentals and Sales
VHS DVD
Rentals Used Sales New Sales Rentals Used Sales New Sales
Panel 1: Rental Priced Titles (N = 12):
Total per
Title (’000) 1112.2 20.3 0.2 129.6 3.7 1.5
Weighted Total
per Title 4054.9 56.8 248.5 491.7 10.4 136.6
Ratio, Weighted
Sales/Rentals 7.5% 29.9%
Panel 2: Sell-through Priced Titles (N = 29):
Total per
Title (’000) 910.5 39.2 0.5 131.8 5.0 0.9
Weighted Total
per Title 3319.5 109.8 327.3 500.1 14.0 158.4
Ratio, Weighted
Sales/Rentals 13.2% 34.5%
46Table 8: Estimated Parameter Values
VHS DVD
(VHS was:)
Rental Sell-through Rental Sell-through
Priced Priced Priced Priced
Avg. βj’s (se):
Store Size 0.195 (0.008) 0.164 (0.011) 0.338 (0.014) 0.261 (0.015)
%Married/kids -0.983 (0.257) -0.757 (0.339) 1.009 (0.399) 0.935 (0.422)
% Suburban -0.120 (0.106) 0.098 (0.139) -0.393 (0.161) -0.288 (0.170)
% DVD Penetration 6.417 (0.925) 2.465 (1.104) -6.482 (1.519) -1.641 (1.486)
E[Xβ] 1.166 0.761 1.157 1.227
Parameters of the Distribution of α(se):*
Constant 0.176 (0.065)
Median Income 0.869 (0.056)
ρ (shape parameter) 3.089 (0.009)
Avg. Quality
Parameters :
E(δr,m,j) 1.321 1.269 1.269 1.165
E(δu,m,j) 1.798 1.846 2.185 1.834
E(δs2,m,j) 1.955 – – –
E(δs,m,j) 2.196 2.088 2.858 2.114
E(δs2,m,j/δs,m,j) 0.890 – – –
E(δr)/E(δs) 0.601 0.608 0.444 0.551
Other Parameters:
τ 23.74 16.91 15.60 15.31
µr -0.01 1.88 0.89 0.40
µu 8.45 7.71 10.29 11.57
µs (period 1) 43.60 9.50 8.19 10.61
µs (period 2) 4.09 – – –
Local Mkt. Size (000s) 5.62 5.49 0.69 0.79
*Constant across titles.
47Table 9: Counterfactual Exercises, VHS
Actual Current “Other” Mkt. Seg.
Rental Priced Titles (12):
pr
w 52.43 45.57 21.90 34.48
ps (per 1) 109.13 89.11 31.65 34.78
ps (per 2) 20.46 14.65 – –
pu 8.45 8.62 8.46 8.62
pr 2.92 2.36 2.75 2.28
% New (per 1) 0.16 0.30 0.09 0.46
% New (per 2) 0.34 1.77 – –
% Used 0.40 0.21 0.43 0.27
% Rent 29.35 46.89 36.46 50.76
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 5.77 6.00 4.58 4.70
Avg. πret (Mil.) 3.01 4.12 4.27 3.04
% Change πstud – 3.99 -23.53 -21.57
% Change πret – 36.83 3.71 -26.22
% Change Con. Surplus – – -28.52 -23.18
Sell-through Priced Titles (29):
pr
w 14.49 15.42 33.40 37.66
ps (per 1) 24.00 25.06 76.94 17.99
ps (per 2) – – 21.11 –
pu 7.71 7.72 7.80 7.79
pr 2.94 3.00 1.75 2.14
% New (per 1) 0.86 1.04 0.00 3.40
% New (per 2) – – 1.16 –
% Used 0.81 0.71 0.29 0.08
% Rent 25.43 24.48 60.92 45.46
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 3.53 3.83 3.68 5.17
Avg. πret (Mil.) 6.41 6.08 2.28 3.09
% Change πstud – 8.42 -3.69 35.20
% Change πret – -5.13 -62.55 -49.19
% Change Con. Surplus – – 18.85 19.70
*Retail and studio proﬁts are weighted to include all outlets.
‘Current’ uses actual µ and τ.
‘Other’ uses counterfactual µ and τ.
‘Mkt. Segm.’ uses µr and τ from rental pricing; µs from sell-through.
48Table 10: Counterfactual Exercises, DVD
Actual Current “Other” Mkt. Seg.
VHS was Rental Priced (12):
pr
w 15.55 14.35 26.99 32.34
ps (per 1) 23.75 23.58 70.55 19.39
ps (per 2) – – 17.99 –
pu 10.29 10.31 10.30 10.28
pr 2.81 2.77 1.43 1.79
% New (per 1) 5.66 7.31 0.02 18.40
% New (per 2) – – 7.35 –
% Used 0.28 0.14 0.29 0.01
% Rent 24.47 29.72 69.97 49.34
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 0.96 0.98 0.66 1.52
Avg. πret (Mil.) 0.58 0.62 0.43 0.37
% Change πstud – 2.63 -33.23 54.92
% Change πret – 5.51 -30.55 -39.86
% Change Con. Surplus – – 11.39 91.29
VHS was Sell-through Priced (29):
pr
w $17.16 15.31 33.89 33.24
ps (per 1) 27.77 26.07 77.10 22.08
ps (per 2) – – 20.10 –
pu 11.57 11.38 11.38 11.38
pr 2.81 2.78 1.67 1.92
% New (per 1) 2.62 3.76 0.00 9.67
% New (per 2) – – 4.73 –
% Used 0.34 0.33 0.21 0.09
% Rent 22.80 29.40 59.69 47.74
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 0.72 0.81 0.62 1.04
Avg. πret (Mil.) 0.61 0.62 0.34 0.29
% Change πstud – 12.23 -23.86 28.56
% Change πret – 1.25 -44.97 -52.40
% Change Con. Surplus – – 12.90 59.24
*Retail and studio proﬁts are weighted to include all outlets.
‘Current’ uses actual µ and τ.
‘Other’ uses counterfactual µ and τ.
‘Mkt. Segm.’ uses µr and τ from rental pricing; µs from sell-through.
49Table 11: Counterfactual Exercises, Future DVD
Sell-thru Rental Mkt.
Priced Priced Segm.
VHS was Rental Priced (12):
pr
w 19.50 44.25 35.62
ps (per 1) 29.40 87.88 27.87
ps (per 2) – 15.75 –
pu 8.55 8.64 8.64
pr 2.56 2.32 2.30
% New (per 1) 0.09 0.25 1.17
% New (per 2) – 1.22 –
% Used 1.33 1.03 0.80
% Rent 39.59 45.45 46.89
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 4.37 6.21 5.20
Avg. πret (Mil.) 4.82 4.03 3.30
% Change πstud – 42.10 19.05
% Change πret – -16.38 -31.66
% Change C. S. – 26.85 5.97
VHS was Sell-through Priced (29):
pr
w 10.95 28.17 30.36
ps (per 1) 21.27 72.38 22.81
ps (per 2) – 18.88 –
pu 7.76 7.74 7.73
pr 2.73 1.56 1.83
% New (per 1) 1.11 0.00 1.96
% New (per 2) – 1.28 –
% Used 0.40 0.45 0.30
% Rent 16.85 36.89 26.72
Avg. πstud (Mil.) 1.42 2.10 2.63
Avg. πret (Mil.) 2.68 1.18 1.52
% Change πstud – 48.60 85.63
% Change πret – -56.09 -43.39
% Change C. S. – 32.23 40.59
*Retail and studio proﬁts are weighted to include all outlets.
‘Current’ uses actual µ and τ.
‘Other’ uses counterfactual µ and τ.
‘Mkt. Segm.’ uses µr and τ from rental pricing; µs from sell-through.
50